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ABSTRACT
The objective of this paper is to study the impact of remittances
upon the origin country of emigrants. In order to achieve our pur-
pose, we have performed a quantitative analysis by using econo-
metric models to highlight the correlation and the causality
between the studied variables. The empirical research focused on
two directions: first, we studied if the remittances cycle is more
stable over the business cycle than private capital flows and sec-
ondly, we analysed the influence of the inflow of remittances on
the economic activity in CEE countries, with emphasis on
Romania. Our results are in accordance with the recent studies in
the field and conclude that the inflow of remittances is more sta-
ble over the business cycle but does not stimulate economic
growth in Romania.
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Migration is a complex phenomenon with a multitude of economic, social, cultural
and security effects. From an economic point of view, it is questionable who will
replace the labour force left in the country, as well as whether the migrants will con-
tribute economically to the development of the country of origin. The studies con-
ducted by international organisations and by researchers revealed that migrants
transfer funds in the home country to support their families. According to official
data by the World Bank (2016), the remittances sent home by workers from develop-
ing countries reached in 2017 the amount of 466 billion USD representing over 70%
from the worldwide flows.
The economic literature has paid increased attention to the influence of remittan-
ces upon the origin country of migrants, since the number of migrants and the
amount of remittances have increased sharply over the last decades, worldwide. There
are two categories of studies regarding the remittances: the first category considers
the macroeconomic determinants of remittances (Leon-Ledesma & Piracha, 2004;
Schiopu & Siegfried, 2006; Silasi & Simina, 2008) and the second category considers
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the individual determinants of remittance motives (Rapoport & Docquier, 2005;
De Sousa & Duval, 2010; Roman, 2013). In this context, we will refer to the first cat-
egory of determinants and more precisely, our purpose is to study the effects of
remittances upon the economic activity of receiving countries from Central and
Eastern Europe (CEE) and in particular from Romania.
We have chosen this country because, as empirical data shows, there is an atypical situ-
ation regarding the relation between the level of migration and the volume of the remit-
tances. It is an interesting case because it is the only country in the CEE that registered
the lowest level of net migration (Figure 1) and also the lowest level of remittances
received (Figure 2).
Figure 1. Net migration in CEE Countries, in the period 1996–2017 (the average values of five-
year estimates).
Source: World Bank database (http://www.worldbank.org/)
Figure 2. Remittances received in CEE Countries, in the period 1996–2017 (the average values).
Source: World Bank database (http://www.worldbank.org/)
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To better understand the impact of remittances on the economy, first we had to
correlate them to the phases of business cycles to see how the emigrants react in dif-
ferent situations (crises or economic boom) and after that we can study their influ-
ence on the main macroeconomic indicators. Consequently, the paper comprises two
different hypotheses that are tested with two different methods, each specifically to
the addressed issue.
The article contributes to the development of knowledge in the economic field by
offering an extensive analysis of the literature regarding the positive effect and the
negative effect of the remittances on the economy of the receiving countries. Another
contribution is related to the empirical analysis that focused on the recent situation
in Central and Eastern European countries which adds value to the existing studies.
The second part of this paper puts forward a short literature review regarding the
aspects of migration, especially the cyclicality of the remittances received and their
impact upon the receiving economies; the third part describes the research method-
ology used; the fourth part presents the main findings of the study and the last sec-
tion concludes, gives some limitations and future research directions.
2. Literature review and hypotheses development
From the research done on migration and remittances we found different concepts of
remittances: for the countries with low income; remittances are a finance of last
resort used mostly for subsistence expenses; for the countries with medium income,
the remittances are a part of a diversified portfolio of finance (Julca, 2013) and can
stimulate the financial sector, if the amounts received are saved (Aggarwal,
Demirg€uç-Kunt, & Perıa, 2010, Toxopeus & Lensink, 2008).
In this context our objective is to study the impact of remittances on the economy
of the CEE countries that had a communist regime before 1990, because they fit into
the two categories mentioned above: low income and medium income countries. To
achieve our objective, first we studied how the emigrants react in different phases of
the business cycle when the economy is vulnerable. Secondly, we studied if the money
they send home has a significant impact on the economy in the short-run and on the
long-run and which was the main channel through which it influenced eco-
nomic growth.
2.1. The cyclicality of remittances
In the literature, the relationship between remittance and business cycle was studied
by De, Islamaj, Kose, and Yousefi (2016) who consider that “If remittances are coun-
tercyclical, then they could help smooth macroeconomic fluctuations, and if they are
procyclical, they could amplify business cycle fluctuations”. According to Ratha
(2007) the remittances tend to be more stable than private capital flows in the stages
of a business cycle. The private capital flows are said to be moving pro-cyclically, but
remittances have remained more resilient to the economic downturns in the receiving
countries (Roman, 2013).
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One of the reasons for the stability could be that the workers are concerned about
their families that are at home (Oda, 2004), and their volume tends to be higher in
times of economic recession or financial crises because migrants living abroad send
more money home to help their families. (Yang & Choi 2007; Mohapatra, Joseph, &
Ratha, 2012).
To continue the previous work and improve the literature on this subject, we for-
mulated the following hypothesis, to be tested for the CEE countries:
H1. The inflow of Remittances is more stable over the business cycle than private
capital flows
2.2. Remittances and the economic growth
In the literature in the field there are theoretical and empirical studies that have as
their objective an answer to the question: What is the impact of the remittances upon
the receiving economies?
These theoretical studies can be grouped by topic in: studies emphasising the positive
impact of remittances on receiving countries and studies emphasising the negative impact
of remittances on receiving countries. In the following tables, we briefly present the stud-
ies on remittances over the last ten years with positive (PE) and negative (NE) effects and
their results.
In the first category of papers, the ones that found a positive effect of remittances
over economic activity (Table 1), it was shown that when analysing the influence of
remittances, the most used indicators were remittances and GDP, in absolute or rela-
tive value, to which other independent or control variables were added. As the
amount of remittances has an impact on the economy, the indicators that affect it,
identified by Lianos (1997) are: the level of income of migrants, the inflation rate,
exchange rate, the interest rate and the number of migrants. Also another factor of
influence is the economic conditions in both countries (Ahmed & Martınez-Zarzoso,
2016). For instance, De Sousa and Duval (2010) studied remittances flows to
Romania, in the period 2005–2009, that were received from various sending coun-
tries. They concluded that “bilateral flows are positively influenced by both home and
host countries’ economic size and geographical distance”.
From the other category of papers (Table 2), Chami, Fullenkamp, and Jahjah
(2003, 2008) found a negative impact of remittances on growth in both studies. In his
study, Abbas, Masood, and Sakhawat (2017) identified variables that have negative
and positive influences on remittances, indicating that their effects may differ on
macroeconomic indicators.
Many studies focused on migration from Central and Eastern European countries, and
on the influence of remittances upon the origin country of migrants (Pirvu & Axinte,
2013; Noja & Moroc, 2016). From the data of the National Institute for Statistics and
from other studies the main destination countries of Romanian emigrants are the devel-
oped countries in the European Union: Spain (Saseanu & Petrescu, 2011), Italy, Germany
and France (Matichescu, Dragan, & Luches, , 2017). The Romanians working abroad have
become, due to their remittances, one of the most important foreign direct investors (in
2017 Remittances were 2.02% of GDP while Foreign Direct Investments were 2.33% of
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Table 1. Short synthesis of main studies regarding remittances with positive effects (PE) on
the economy.
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GDP), which are considered a large source of external financing. (Gradi, 2014 and
Bucevska, 2011). Under those circumstances, there are more and more questions about
the way those remittances influence not only the migrants’ families that were left behind,
but also the economic development of the country.
To contribute to the development of the literature for the CEE countries, we for-
mulated the second hypothesis:
H2. The inflow of Remittances has a significant influence on the economy of the
receiving country
3. Research methodology
To study the effects of migration and in particular the impact of remittances on the
economic activity of the receiving country, an econometric analysis was made using
annual data series from theWorld Bank, for a time span of 21 years (1996–2017). We
collected the information regarding gross domestic product (GDP), the inflow of
remittances (Remit), the inflow of foreign domestic investments (FDI), the rate of
investment (Inv), the value of the export of goods and services (Exp), the final con-
sumption expenditure (Cons) and the estimated five years’ values of net migration
for the countries in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). We used Stata 13 software
for the testing and estimation of the econometric analysis.
The empirical research began with the study of the dynamics of remittances (as %
of GDP), net migration and the GDP per capita (expressed million USD at constant
prices) in the CEE countries. In this context, we observed an atypical situation
regarding the relationship between the number of emigrants and the volume of
received remittances in the case of Romania, which we have chosen to compare and
contrast its results with the other CEE countries.
Table 1. Continued.
Authors Objective Country, Period Main indicators Results
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To validate the first hypothesis, (H1) The inflow of Remittances is more stable than
the inflow of foreign direct investment over the business cycle, we would use Hodrick-
Prescott high-pass filter (HP filter) that extracts the cyclical component (ct) of the





ytstð Þ2 þ k
XT1
t¼2
stþ1stð Þ stst1ð Þ 2
 !
(1)
Where st is the trend, yt is the time series for: Gross Domestic Product (GDP),
Remittances (Remit) and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and k is the multiplier that
Table 2. Short synthesis of main studies regarding remittances with negative effects (NE) on
the economy.
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controls the frequency of the extracted series which took the value 6.25 for annual
data (Curea-Pitorac, 2018).
After we obtained the cyclical component for the indicators we would employ the
methodology used by Sayan (2006) and calculated the contemporaneous cross-corre-
lations and asynchronous correlations (the remittances and foreign direct investment
cyclical component was used at time t-1, t and tþ 1) between them to identify the
nature of the co-movement: procyclical, countercyclical or acyclical. This method
would enable us to identify how the remittances received and the inflow of foreign
direct investments respond to cyclical fluctuations.
The empirical research performed for the second hypothesis, H2. The inflow of
Remittances has a significant influence on the economy of the receiving country, was
made for 11 CEE countries: Bulgaria (BGR), Czech Republic (CZE), Estonia (EST),
Croatia (HRV), Hungary (HUN), Lithuania (LTU), Latvia (LVA), Poland (POL),
Romania (ROU), Slovak Republic (SVK) and Slovenia (SVN).
To test this hypothesis, we would analyse the evolution of the indicators over the
economic activity using descriptive statistics, correlations and variables dynamics,
construct the regression model and apply a series of pre-estimation test that deter-
mined the type of regression we used.
Adapting the methodology from Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz (2009) and Bettin and
Zazzaro (2012) we started with an OLS regression to first determine the nature of
remittances and the main channel through which it influences the economic growth.
The following regression model was tested for each country.
GDPit ¼ ait þ b1Remitit þ b2Invit þ b3Remit  Invit þ et (2)
The dependent variable was the rate of change of the real GDP per capita; the
independent variable was the remittances (Remit) received because the main objective
is to study the impact of remittances on the economy. To control for endogeneity, we
addressed the problem of omitted variable by adding in the model four control varia-
bles, that have an impact on GDP/cap: Foreign Direct Investments (FDI), Investment
rate (Inv), Export of goods and services (Exp) and Final consumption expenditures
(Cons). In consequence, the regression model was the following:
GDPit ¼ ait þ b1Remitit þ b2FDIit þ b3Invit þ b4 Exp it þ b5Consit þ et (3)
Where at represents the constant term (or intercept), b1 to b3 are the coefficients
of the explanatory variable, et is the error term, i represents each CEE country and t
represents the analysed years (1996–2017).
The pre-estimation testing began with Augmented Dickey Fuller unit-root test to
check for stationarity; the multicollinerity for the independent variables was deter-
mined by variance inflation factor (VIF), and the Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test
was used to check for heteroscedasticity. Also, we checked for serial correlation in the
disturbance with Breusch-Godfrey LM test and for autoregressive conditional hetero-
scedasticity (ARCH) with LM test.
To study the causal relation between the variables, we would start with defining an
autoregressive vector (VAR) for the empirical study, because we want to capture the
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linear interdependencies between the past lags of the variable itself and past lags of
the other variables. From the lag-order selection test it was revealed that the model
has two lags and the Johansen tests showed cointegration among variables so we had
to extend the VAR model to a vector error correction model (VECM). In this way
we will be able to identify the short-run and the long-run relationship between varia-
bles (Golitsis, Avdiu, & Szamosi, 2018). The model is the following:
Dyt ¼ ab’yt 1 þ
Xp1
t¼1
CiDtti þ et (4)
Where yt represents the vector of the endogenous variables, a and b are the par-
ameter matrices with rank r< k, Ci the matrices of parameters, et is a vector of nor-
mally distributed errors and t represents the analysed years (1996–2017).
The robustness analysis would include post-estimation tests, like Lagrange-multi-
plier test for autocorrelation in residuals and Granger causality Wald test. Also, the
stability condition of estimates was checked obtaining the eigenvalue roots of the
companion matrix.
4. Results and discussions
4.1. Descriptive analysis
To ensure a high degree of comparability from the perspective of economic develop-
ment, we focused the empirical analysis on the countries from Central and Eastern
Europe (CEE), the former socialist ones. Data series regarding the inflow of the
remittances (as percent of GDP), showed (Figure 2) that the average value for the
studied period varied from 3.44% of GDP (in Croatia) to 0.73% of GDP (in
Romania). The first notable feature was that almost all of them registered a high level
of inflow of remittance. The first three places were held by Croatia, (3.44% of GDP),
Bulgaria (3.39% of GDP) and Latvia (3.21% of GDP) and in the last place was
Romania (0.67% of GDP).
The more developed countries have a positive net migration, which means that the
number of immigrants was higher than the number of emigrants, and the developing
countries have a negative value of net migration. In CEE, only four countries had a
positive value of net migration: Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovenia and Slovakia
(Figure 1).
Given the registered values of the remittances, we compared them with net migra-
tion and expected a direct correlation between them. The countries that registered a
high percentage of remittances should have a larger number of emigrants, and thus a
negative net migration. This was the case for almost all of them, except Romania,
which registers the lowest level of remittances received and also the lowest level of
net migration.
In search for an explanation for this atypical situation we studied the real GDP
per capita for all CEE countries. The indicator was expressed in million USD at con-
stant prices with the base year 2010. In Figure 3, the average value of the indicator
for the period studied was presented, from the highest levels of GDP per capita
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(Slovenia and Czech Republic) to the lowest levels of GDP/cap (Romania
and Bulgaria).
A possible explanation for this situation is that the inflow of remittances entered
the country on informal channels, and in reality the volume is much higher, as sug-
gested by a survey of the Romanian Institute of Evaluation and Strategy (IRES) real-
ised in the period 2006–2015. Another reason could be the high levels of the non-
observed economy in Romania. It is well known that in Romania the level of the
underground economy is still high (Imbrescu, 2007), above the EU average, and the
value of remittances has been transferred to an increasing proportion by informal
means (50% in 2004, OECD, 2006).
The descriptive statistics of the variables used to test the second hypothesis (the
growth rate of real GDP per capita, remittances, foreign direct investment (FDI),
investment rate and export of goods and services) are presented in Table 3. The aver-
age value of the remittances in the studied period among the CEE countries was
1.85% of GDP; it varied from 0.72% (ROU) to 3.43% (HRV). The average value of
FDI was 5.04% of GDP, with a minimum value of 1.93% (SVN) and maximum
10.17% (HUN). The investment rate recorded an average value of 25.62%, the lowest
rate was 21.07% (LTU) and the highest was 30% (CZE). Regarding the value of
export, it varied among countries from 33.35% (ROU) to 73.09% (SVK) with an aver-
age value of 54.62% of GDP.
4.2. The cyclical characteristics of remittances in CEE countries
To validate the first hypothesis which claims that the remittances are more stable
over the business cycle than private capital flows, we performed contemporaneous
correlations with time lag of the cyclical components of GDP, Remittances and
Foreign Direct Investment for the CEE countries.
Figure 3. Real GDP per capita in CEE Countries, in the period 1996–2017 (constant millions USD,
the average values).
Source: World Bank database (http://www.worldbank.org/)
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Table 3. Descriptive statistics.
Country Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
DF unit root
test (for 1st diff)
BGR Real GDP/cap growth 22 1.03 0.037 0.94 1.08 7.34
Remittances (%GDP) 22 3.39 2.27 0.31 8.19 1.801
FDI (%GDP) 22 8.17 7.51 1.07 31.24 2.95
Investment rate (%) 22 23.19 7.43 5.93 37.86 2.92
Export (%GDP) 22 50.38 11.07 33.90 66.32 3.67
Consumption (%GDP) 22 82.52 4.47 74.48 88.45 5.07
CZE Real GDP/cap growth 22 1.022 0.028 0.94 1.06 4.90
Remittances (%GDP) 22 0.76 0.43 0.11 1.66 1.801
FDI (%GDP) 22 5.06 2.82 0.90 10.37 6.87
Investment rate (%) 22 30.00 1.13 28.17 32.07 4.93
Export (%GDP) 22 60.87 14.81 38.31 82.54 3.49
Consumption (%GDP) 22 68.96 1.93 65.48 72.16 4.64
EST Real GDP/cap growth 22 1.04 0.060 0.85 1.13 5.00
Remittances (%GDP) 22 1.27 0.89 0.034 2.36 1.801
FDI (%GDP) 22 7.87 5.24 3.20 22.32 8.46
Investment rate (%) 22 28.91 4.91 20.32 38.48 3.05
Export (%GDP) 22 70.28 9.59 57.39 86.53 3.80
Consumption (%GDP) 22 73.11 3.04 69.16 80.01 3.76
HRV Real GDP/cap growth 22 1.02 0.033 0.92 1.067 6.24
Remittances (%GDP) 22 3.43 0.633 2.26 4.53 1.801
FDI (%GDP) 22 4.06 1.977 0.32 7.60 6.84
Investment rate (%) 22 24.87 3.002 19.43 31.20 3.44
Export (%GDP) 22 39.10 5.85 29.48 51.26 3.61
Consumption (%GDP) 22 80.29 3.19 76.60 87.27 4.50
HUN Real GDP/cap growth 22 1.02 0.026 093 1.05 6.36
Remittances (%GDP) 22 1.66 1.22 0.291 3.70 1.801
FDI (%GDP) 22 10.17 18.14 15.9 55.48 5.65
Investment rate (%) 22 25.36 1.63 22.15 27.06 3.95
Export (%GDP) 22 71.34 15.28 41.84 90.21 3.73
Consumption (%GDP) 22 71.01 2.55 69.20 79.18 4.54
LTU Real GDP/cap growth 22 1.05 0.054 0.86 1.12 5.27
Remittances (%GDP) 22 2.35 1.67 0.02 4.50 1.801
FDI (%GDP) 22 3.21 1.95 0.04 8.23 5.42
Investment rate (%) 22 21.07 2.77 15.99 27.98 3.58
Export (%GDP) 22 57.70 16.53 32.41 84.06 3.82
Consumption (%GDP) 22 83.72 3.22 78.89 89.30 4.59
LVA Real GDP/cap growth 22 1.05 0.58 0.87 1.12 3.85
Remittances (%GDP) 22 3.21 1.93 0.64 6.05 1.801
FDI (%GDP) 22 4.04 2.27 0.12 8.78 3.77
Investment rate (%) 22 25.37 5.43 15.17 36.90 3.42
Export (%GDP) 22 46.34 10.32 35.03 61.30 3.01
Consumption (%GDP) 22 81.59 3.45 77.48 89.84 5.67
POL Real GDP/cap growth 22 1.038 0.018 1 1.07 6.62
Remittances (%GDP) 22 1.35 0.599 0.48 2.46 1.801
FDI (%GDP) 22 3.37 1.48 .151 6.22 5.17
Investment rate (%) 22 22.29 2.01 18.72 25.27 3.12
Export (%GDP) 22 36.75 9.60 22.09 53.39 5.38
Consumption (%GDP) 22 80.07 2.27 76.05 84.96 3.52
ROU Real GDP/cap growth 22 1.03 0.044 0.94 1.10 5.51
Remittances (%GDP) 22 .72 .669 .044 2.02 1.801
FDI (%GDP) 22 3.57 2.252 .707 8.909 5.76
Investment rate (%) 22 25.85 6.31 17.88 41.47 4.06
Export (%GDP) 22 33.35 5.67 22.86 41.44 3.66
Consumption (%GDP) 22 81.79 4.36 75.21 89.25 4.00
SVK Real GDP/cap growth 22 1.035 0.033 0.944 1.107 5.82
Remittances (%GDP) 22 1.341 0.947 0.061 2.44 1.801
FDI (%GDP) 22 3.975 3.085 0.35 12.00 8.30
Investment rate (%) 22 27.87 3.741 23.25 24.64 4.90
Export (%GDP) 22 73.09 16.91 46.65 96.30 3.68
Consumption (%GDP) 22 75.25 1.591 72.63 80.35 5.02
(continued)
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Table 4 reports the coefficients for each country and for all of them and the high-
est correlation coefficient, at the absolute value, is shown in bold. The results
obtained highlight three types of remittances co-movement: acyclical (in five coun-
tries, BGR, POL, ROU, SVK and SVN), procyclical (in four countries, CZE, EST,
HUN and LTU) and countercyclical (in two countries, HRV and LVA) and two types
of foreign direct investment co-movement: procyclical (for BGR, HUN, LTU, LVA
and POL) and acyclical (for CZE, EST, HRV, ROU, SVK and SVN).
For most of the countries the strongest correlation coefficient was registered at
tþ 1; the flows of remittances and FDI reacted with a time lag of one year.
According to the literature mentioned above, to validate the hypothesis, the FDI co-
movement should be procyclical while the remittances co-movement should be coun-
tercyclical or acyclical. This is the case for only two countries: Bulgaria (BGR) and
Latvia (LVA).
The highest correlation coefficients were recorded for Estonia (EST) and The
Czech Republic (CZE), where remittances received were not synchronous with the
business cycle. The same type of procyclical movement was found in Hungary
(HUN) and Lithuania (LTU). The results signify that the emigrants from these coun-
tries increased the money they sent home in expansion periods but with a time lag of
one year. Graphically, the GDP and Remittances cycles can be observed in Figure 4.
Another type of co-movement, a countercyclical one, was identified in Croatia
(HRV) and Latvia (LVA). Here, the emigrants increase the value of remittances in
Table 3. Continued.
Country Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
DF unit root
test (for 1st diff)
SVN Real GDP/cap growth 22 1.023 0.333 0.913 1.063 5.06
Remittances (%GDP) 22 0.838 0.182 0.545 1.282 1.801
FDI (%GDP) 22 1.930 1.785 0.68 7.85 5.62
Investment rate (%) 22 27.037 4.374 19.73 33.966 2.92
Export (%GDP) 22 61.611 11.97 44.14 82.210 4.09
Consumption (%GDP) 22 73.627 2.429 68.42 77.075 2.82
Note: and  represent 1% and 5% significance level.
Source: Own computation using Stata 13 software.
Table 4. The correlations between GDP cycle and Remittances cycle in Central and Eastern



















Whole sample 20.0293 0.016 0.0132 0.1579 0.0118 0.1268 Acyclical Acyclical
BGR 0.0693 0.024 0.1046 0.360 0.0106 0.573 Acyclical Procyclical
CZE 0.44 0.121 0.051 0.011 0.686 0.306 Procyclical Acyclical
EST 0.181 0.235 0.2107 0.072 0.788 0.282 Procyclical Acyclical
HRV 20.49 0.317 0.206 0.2637 0.063 0.028 Countercyclical Acyclical
HUN 0.0515 0.410 0.3498 0.3411 0.457 0.019 Procyclical Procyclical
LTU 0.38 0.123 0.0240 0.525 0.3844 0.356 Procyclical Procyclical
LVA 0.1953 0.164 0.312 0.665 20.57 0.761 Countercyclical Procyclical
POL 0.171 0.255 0.1360 0.417 0.2172 0.350 Acyclical Acyclical
ROU 0.036 0.026 0.2607 0.192 0.3488 0.1007 Acyclical Acyclical
SVK 0.0820 20.215 0.1527 0.085 0.2120 0.1520 Acyclical Acyclical
SVN 0.167 20.196 0.1854 0.141 0.0608 0.1522 Acyclical Acyclical
Note: ,  and  represent 1%, 5% and 10% significance level.
Source: Own computation using Stata 13 software.
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recession or economic crises periods, to help their families in difficult times. Both
movements are asynchronous: in LVA they respond with a time lag of one year after
the event and in HRV one year before (Figure 5).
For the rest of the countries, the correlation coefficients revealed an acyclical co-
movement (both of remittances and of FDI). A factor that contributed to this situ-
ation could be the availability of data series regarding the remittances, which can be
Figure 4. The procyclical movement of the GDP and Remittances cycles in CEE coun-
tries (1996–2017).
Figure 5. The countercyclical movement of the GDP Remittances and Foreign Direct Investment
cycles in CEE countries (1996–2017).
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found only annually. Considering that the analysed period is not very long, compris-
ing only 21 years, an improved result could be obtained by analysing quarterly or
monthly data (Figure 6).
Among the countries that register an acyclical movement (BGR, POL, SVK,
SVN) is also Romania. Studying its GDP cycle, we identified two periods of reces-
sion in our timespan (2001–2003 and 2009–2012). In the first one, 2001–2003,
when only the Romanian economy experienced an economic crisis, the volume of
Remittances followed an upward trend, the movement was countercyclical, but in
the second period, 2009–2012, during the global economic crises, it decreased, a
procyclical movement. According to a study, in the first year of crises, 100,000
Romanians working abroad have lost their jobs [… ] However, only 14% of them
had the intention to come back to Romania, 33% will remain for 2–5 more years
abroad, 15% will come back only after 5 years, while 29% have no intention of
coming back (Sirghi & Hategan, 2011).
The results obtained are in accordance with other studies in the literature;
Jackman (2014) studied the correlation with the business cycle in Barbados, Jamaica
and U.S. and obtained a procyclical movement and Cooray and Mallick (2013) devel-
oped a large study on 116 countries worldwide and found a strong positive correl-
ation between the variables. The countercyclical movement was also obtained by
Bettin, Presbitero, Spatafora, and Nikola (2017) on 79 developing countries, by
Frankel (2011) who studied 64 countries worldwide and by De et al. (2016) with an
extensive study on 109 countries divided as developed, developing and emerging.
In conclusion, the first hypothesis was validated especially for two countries (HRV
and LVA) but also for other countries where the movement was acyclical and for the
whole group, the correlation coefficient was negative, indicating a countercyclical co-
movement but very low to be taken into consideration.
Figure 6. The acyclical movement of the GDP and Remittances cycles in CEE coun-
tries (1996–2017).
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4.3. The VECM analysis
After the descriptive analysis of the indicators presented in the section above, we
used the Dickey Fuller test, to check for unit root, and this showed that the variables
were not stationary, so we calculated the first difference, redid the test and obtained
all variables, for all countries, integrated of first order and stationary at 10% level of
significance (Table 3). From the correlation matrix (Table 5), we observed that
between the real GDP/cap expressed as rate of change and the percent of Remittances
there was a positive but non-significant correlation.
The growth regression was estimated first, taking into consideration only remittances
and after that included in the model a channel of propagation of their effects, invest-
ment rate, as well as the interaction between the two. A negative interaction coefficient
(as can be seen in Table 6) showed that the remittances have a bigger impact on
Table 5. The correlation matrix at panel level for CEE countries.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
(1) Real GDP/cap growth 1
(2) Remittances (%GDP) 0.0569
(0.3779)
1
































Note: p-values are reported in parenthesis.
Source: Own computation using Stata 13 software.
Table 6. The estimates of OLS regression.
Country R-squared F Remittances Investment rate RemitInv
Whole sample 0.58 338.21 0.32
0.98 3984.78 0.35 0.039 0.013
BGR 0.71 53.72 0.21
0.96 163.30 0.31 0.051 0.014
CZE 0.77 71.60 1.03
0.99 9800.68 0.52 0.032 0.015
EST 0.66 42.08 0.55
0.99 716.36 0.37 0.041 0.016
HRV 0.97 702.91 0.28
0.99 5380.84 0.32 0.040 0.012
HUN 0.65 40.21 0.40
0.99 3727.8 0.37 0.040 0.014
LTU 0.67 42.66 0.30
0.99 1856.82 0.23 0.054 0.012
LVA 0.71 52.27 0.23
0.98 432.92 0.30 0.045 0.012
POL 0.84 115.55 0.64
0.99 5457.42 0.64 0.046 0.028
ROU 0.56 27.72 0.79
0.98 467.53 1.54 0.042 0.058
SVK 0.68 44.64 0.52
0.99 1949.32 0.32 0.032 0.008
SVN 0.95 495.59 1.16
0.99 4786.30 1.18 0.036 0.042
Note: and  represent 1% and 5% significance level.
Source: Own computation using Stata 13 software.
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economic growth when the investment rate is low. Also, comparing the two regres-
sions, if the marginal impact of remittances is bigger in the first one it means that the
investment is the main channel through which remittances influence economic growth.
This situation was recorded in four countries: CZE, EST, HUN and LTU.
After we performed an OLS regression, we carried out some pre-estimation tests
to decide what method to use subsequently. Obtaining a mean VIF of 6.26 meant
that we did not have a multicollinearity problem; the Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg
test showed a chi2(1) of 4.16 with a p-value of 0.0415, lower than 0.05, so we reject
the null hypothesis of homoscedasticity or constant variance at 5% level of signifi-
cance. The Breusch-Godfrey LM test shown a p-value of 0.946 leading us to accept
the null hypothesis of no-serial autocorrelation and for ARCH test we obtained a
chi2 of 0.001 with a p-value of 0.9815, thus accepting the hull hypothesis of no
ARCH effects. The Johansen cointegration test suggested a long-run relationship
among variables and therefore a VEC model could be estimated.
For the estimations of the VECM we considered as dependent variable GDP/cap
and as independent variables Remittances, FDI, investment rate, export and con-
sumption, the last four of them being control variables. The results are presented in
Table 7 for each country separately. For the cointegration equations we took into
consideration only GDP/cap and Remittances, together with the constant term and
trend, where this was the case.
The short-run influence of remittances on GDP/cap was validated, at 10% level of
significance, only in two countries: CZE and LTU. In the case of Romania, the GDP/
cap is influenced in the short run by the foreign direct investments (at 5% level of
significance), by the rate of investment and by the export of goods and services (both
at 1% level of significance).
Regarding the long-run influence of remittances on GDP/cap it was found only in six
CEE countries (BGR, CZE, EST, HUN, LTU and LVA) and for the rest of them, the p-
value of the independent variables was above the 5% threshold and validated the null
hypothesis. In two countries the long-run influence is positive: in LTU and LVA if the
remittances received increase at 1% they will lead to an increase of GDP/cap with 0.03%.
For the case of Romania, we did not find a long-run influence on economic growth.
To study the economic growth response to shocks through time, we employed an
impulse response function and observed (Figure 7) that for some countries the impact
Table 7. The estimates of VECM.
Country R-sq Chi2
Short-run parameters
Cointegration equationsRemit FDI Inv Exp Cons
BGR 0.90 94.36 – 0.1 0.01 – – DGDP ¼ 0.22  0.012DRemit – 0.002Trend
CZE 0.92 131.96 0.1 – 0.05 0.01 0.05 DGDP ¼ 0.051  0.089DRemit þ 0.003Trend
EST 0.90. 92.43 – – – – 0.5 DGDP ¼ 0.077DRemit
HRV 0.93 153.64 – – 0.05 0.01 – –
HUN 0.61 15.93 – – – – – DGDP ¼ 0.061DRemit
LTU 0.95 234.01 0.1 – – – 0.01 DGDP ¼ 0.021þ 0.03DRemit þ0.002
LVA 0.80 40.51 – 0.01 0.05 0.05 – DGDP ¼ 0.017þ 0.032DRemit  0.022Trend
POL 0.90 100.83 – 0.05 0.05 – – –
ROU 0.89 87.77 – 0.05 0.01 0.01 – –
SVK 0.94 173.10 – – 0.05 – 0.1 –
SVN 0.95 232.60 – – 0.01 0.05 – –
Note: 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 show the level of significance.
Source: Own computation using Stata 13 software.
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diminishes over time (BGR, CZE, EST, LVA, POL, SVK and SVN) and for others, it
oscillates (HRV, HUN, LTU, ROU), which means the inflow of remittances could
produce effects in the following years but the impact was not very large.
For the first category of countries, remittances had an impact on the economy in
the first two years and after that the effect faded away, but for the second category, a
significant impact was recorded five or six years after the shock.
4.4. Robustness analysis
To verify the robustness of our model, we employed three post-estimation tests.
Lagrange-multiplier test showed (for each country) an autocorrelation at lag 2 at 10%
level of significance (the p-value was 0.08) but at 5% level of confidence, we can
reject the null hypothesis. The stability condition of estimates is met (for all coun-
tries) because the modulus of each eigenvalue is less than 1 and inside the companion
matrix.
Next, was performed the Wald test for Granger causality, which measures if statis-
tically the “Remittances” variable happens before the “y” variable, not necessarily a
causal effect (Table 8) and “y” was represented by: GDP/cap, FDI, Investment rate,
Export and Consume.
Figure 7. The impulse response function for CEE countries.
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For the case of Romania, we rejected two hypotheses and obtained that
Remittances Granger-cause Investment rate and Export. As for GDP/cap, the H0 was
accepted, the Remittances does not Granger-cause economic growth. Comparing the
Table 8. Granger causality Wald tests results.
Country Null Hypothesis Chi2 Decision
BGR Remittances does not Granger cause GDP/cap growth 7.236 Reject
Remittances does not Granger cause FDI 2.223 Accept
Remittances does not Granger cause Investment rate 5.130 Reject
Remittances does not Granger cause Export 3.113 Accept
Remittances does not Granger cause Consumption 3.857 Accept
CZE Remittances does not Granger cause GDP/cap growth 41.42 Reject
Remittances does not Granger cause FDI 5.12 Reject
Remittances does not Granger cause Investment rate 34.73 Reject
Remittances does not Granger cause Export 7.46 Reject
Remittances does not Granger cause Consumption 30.19 Reject
EST Remittances does not Granger cause GDP/cap growth 8.923 Reject
Remittances does not Granger cause FDI 71.334 Reject
Remittances does not Granger cause Investment rate 6.19 Reject
Remittances does not Granger cause Export 12.83 Reject
Remittances does not Granger cause Consumption 7.03 Reject
HRV Remittances does not Granger cause GDP/cap growth 3.688 Accept
Remittances does not Granger cause FDI 3.484 Accept
Remittances does not Granger cause Investment rate 4.151 Accept
Remittances does not Granger cause Export 0.239 Accept
Remittances does not Granger cause Consumption 0.125 Accept
HUN Remittances does not Granger cause GDP/cap growth 14.242 Reject
Remittances does not Granger cause FDI 0.591 Accept
Remittances does not Granger cause Investment rate 2.959 Accept
Remittances does not Granger cause Export 27.808 Reject
Remittances does not Granger cause Consumption 15.996 Reject
LTU Remittances does not Granger cause GDP/cap growth 0.669 Accept
Remittances does not Granger cause FDI 6.455 Reject
Remittances does not Granger cause Investment rate 0.147 Accept
Remittances does not Granger cause Export 4.484 Accept
Remittances does not Granger cause Consumption 2.204 Accept
LVA Remittances does not Granger cause GDP/cap growth 4.993 Reject
Remittances does not Granger cause FDI 1.694 Accept
Remittances does not Granger cause Investment rate 4.076 Accept
Remittances does not Granger cause Export 7.306 Reject
Remittances does not Granger cause Consumption 11.735 Reject
POL Remittances does not Granger cause GDP/cap growth 16.659 Reject
Remittances does not Granger cause FDI 1.939 Accept
Remittances does not Granger cause Investment rate 22.493 Reject
Remittances does not Granger cause Export 1.597 Accept
Remittances does not Granger cause Consumption 0.516 Accept
ROU Remittances does not Granger cause GDP/cap growth 0.812 Accept
Remittances does not Granger cause FDI 4.352 Accept
Remittances does not Granger cause Investment rate 8.365 Reject
Remittances does not Granger cause Export 5.152 Reject
Remittances does not Granger cause Consumption 0.440 Accept
SVK Remittances does not Granger cause GDP/cap growth 4.623 Reject
Remittances does not Granger cause FDI 8.322 Reject
Remittances does not Granger cause Investment rate 2.944 Accept
Remittances does not Granger cause Export 10.145 Reject
Remittances does not Granger cause Consumption 0.401 Accept
SVN Remittances does not Granger cause GDP/cap growth 3.679 Accept
Remittances does not Granger cause FDI 4.215 Accept
Remittances does not Granger cause Investment rate 29.367 Reject
Remittances does not Granger cause Export 0.104 Accept
Remittances does not Granger cause Consumption 3.579 Accept
Note: ,  and  represent 1%, 5% and 10% significance level.
Source: Own computation using Stata 13 software.
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results for the CEE, there were seven countries where the first hypothesis was rejected
and obtained that Remittances Granger-cause GDP/cap growth: BGR, CZE, EST,
HUN, LVA, POL and SVK. An interesting case also is POL and SVK because the
causality effect was identified but from the VECM estimations resulted that there is
no long-run or short-run influence of Remit on GDP/cap.
The results for the seven countries are similar with the one obtained by Golitsis
et al. (2018) for Albania, regarding the Granger-causality between Remittances and
GDP. Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz (2009) studying 100 countries, obtained a positive
influence of remittances on the economic growth; Siddique, Selvanathan, and
Selvanathan (2012), Matuzeviciute and Butkus (2016) and Meyer and Shera (2016)
also concluded that the volume of remittances stimulates economic growth for some
receiving countries.
In the literature, there are some studies that obtained empirical results similar to
the case of Romania, regarding the lack of influence of remittances on economic
growth: Chami et al. (2003) considers that “remittances reduce long-term growth”
and Jongwanich (2007) believes that remittance flows “increase the level of income
for the poor rather than the growth of the economy as a whole”.
The results for CEE countries conclude that the volume of remittances has an
impact on economic growth in the short run and in the long run, depending on the
conditions and the specificity of each country.
5. Conclusions
The objective of this paper was to study the nature of the remittances and their
impact upon the economy of receiving countries in Central and Eastern Europe. In
order to achieve our purpose, we have performed a quantitative analysis by using
contemporaneous correlations and econometric models to validate our hypotheses.
We validated the first hypothesis, that remittances are more stable than private
capital flows over the business cycle in some of the CEE countries. Using contempor-
aneous and synchronous correlations we identified four countries where the co-move-
ment of the cyclical component of GDP and remittances was procyclical (CZE, EST,
HUN and LTU), two countries where it was countercyclical (HRV and LVA) and for
five countries and for the whole group the results showed an acyclical movement. But
the hypothesis was validated only for two countries, Bulgaria and Latvia, in which
FDI flow was procyclical while the remittances co-movement was countercyclical
or acyclical.
The second hypothesis was not validated for the Romanian economy, the results
showed neither a long-run or a short-run influence or a Granger causality, but for
other CEE countries the hypothesis was validated. We identified six countries for
which we could estimate long-run parameters (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia,
Hungary, Lithuania and Latvia) and two of them, Czech Republic and Lithuania, also
showed a short-run influence of remittances on economic growth.
Our empirical results regarding Romania reveal that the inflow of remittances that
entered the country through official channel did not influence significantly economic
growth, but the volume of remittances that enter the country through informal
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channels was much higher. Thus, an appropriate policy should be made to address
this situation and also to lower the level of the underground economy.
Some limitations of this article were identified: the biggest one is related to the
fact that the data regarding the remittances is incomplete, as Chirila and Chirila
(2017) also noted in their paper. Data collected quarterly could help obtaining more
reliable results than the annual data, and secondly, in the literature there are other
methods that could be used to study the influence of remittances on economic activ-
ity, like a dynamic panel data analysis, similar with Catrinescu, Leon-Ledesma,
Piracha, and Quillin (2009), instead of a time series analysis.
As a future research direction we propose a study that identifies which economic
indicator is most influenced by the remittances, what people are doing with the
money they receive – they consume, save or invest the money – and how it influen-
ces their households and their wellbeing in Romania. Also, this study could be
extended for other countries in the European Union.
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